ISSN 0798- 1406 ~ De pó si to le gal pp 198502ZU132

Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas

La re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas, es una pu bli ca ción aus pi cia da por el Ins ti tu to

de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co “Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che” (IEPDP) de la Fa-

cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas de la Uni ver si dad del Zu lia.

En tre sus ob je ti vos fi gu ran: con tri buir con el pro gre so cien tí fi co de las Cien cias

Hu ma nas y So cia les, a tra vés de la di vul ga ción de los re sul ta dos lo gra dos por sus in ves-

ti ga do res; es ti mu lar la in ves ti ga ción en es tas áreas del sa ber; y pro pi ciar la pre sen ta-

ción, dis cu sión y con fron ta ción de las ideas y avan ces cien tí fi cos con com pro mi so so cial.

Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas apa re ce dos ve ces al año y pu bli ca tra ba jos ori gi na les con

avan ces o re sul ta dos de in ves ti ga ción en las áreas de Cien cia Po lí ti ca y De re cho Pú bli-

co, los cua les son so me ti dos a la con si de ra ción de ár bi tros ca li fi ca dos.

ESTA PU BLI CA CIÓN APA RE CE RE SE ÑA DA, EN TRE OTROS ÍN DI CES, EN

Re vicyhLUZ, In ter na tio nal Po li ti cal Scien ce Abs tracts, Re vis ta In ter ame ri ca na de

Bi blio gra fía, en el Cen tro La ti no ame ri ca no para el De sa rrol lo (CLAD), en Bi blio-

gra fía So cio Eco nó mi ca de Ve ne zue la de RE DIN SE, In ter na tio nal Bi blio graphy of

Po li ti cal Scien ce, Re vencyt, His pa nic Ame ri can Pe rio di cals In dex/HAPI), Ul ri ch’s

Pe rio di cals Di rec tory, EBS CO. Se en cuen tra acre di ta da al Re gis tro de Pu bli ca cio-

nes Cien tí fi cas y Tec no ló gi cas Ve ne zo la nas del FO NA CIT, La tin dex.

Di rec to ra

OIRALITH

M. C

HIRINOS

ORTILLO

Co mi té Edi tor

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Ma ría Eu ge nia Soto Hernández

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Co mi té Ase sor

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J. M. Del ga do Ocan do

José Ce rra da

Ri car do Com bel las

An gel Lom bar di

Die ter Nohlen

Al fre do Ra mos Ji mé nez

Go ran Ther born

Frie drich Welsch

Asis ten tes Ad mi nis tra ti vos

Joan López Urdaneta y Nil da Ma rín

Re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas. Av. Gua ji ra. Uni ver si dad del Zu lia. Nú cleo Hu ma nís ti co. Fa-

cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas. Ins ti tu to de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co

“Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che”. Ma ra cai bo, Ve ne zue la. E- mail: cues tio nes po li ti cas@gmail.

com ~ loi chi ri nos por til lo@gmail.com. Te le fax: 58- 0261- 4127018.

Vol. 40, Nº 72 (2022), 716-728

IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ

Recibido el 09/09/2021 Aceptado el 28/12/2021

Comparative analysis of the prevention

of the laundering of the proceeds of crime

in dierent countries

DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4072.42

Nadezda Vasilievna Sedova *

Darya Mikhailovna Melnikova **

Ludmila Sergeevna Marien ***

Darina Alexandrovna Sizova ****

Abstract

The objective of the research was to analyze the ght against

the laundering of money obtained by criminal means as one of

the priorities of the socio-economic development of all countries

with advanced economies. This is particularly important in the

period of the ght against COVID-19, when countries faced global

economic decline, growing budget decits, and the need to nd

mechanisms to stimulate economic growth under conditions

of a large number of restrictions imposed by coronavirus infection. The

authors used the methods of analysis of scientic documents, laws and legal

norms. As a result, a comparative analysis of the main elements of anti-

money laundering systems in dierent countries was carried out and, in

addition, the characteristics of the construction of AML/CFT systems at the

international level are indicated. It is concluded that, as a rule, government

authorities start from the understanding that banks know their customers

and understand their operations better than the nancial intelligence

agency and the supervisory authority. Therefore, they also believe that

it is necessary to send the nancial intelligence agency already «leaked»

information about suspicious transactions, which will probably be used by

law enforcement authorities.

Keyword: anti-money laundering law; control threshold; criminal

proceeds; nancial intelligence; global nancial sector.

* Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Moscow, Russia. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-

0002-5670-2437

** Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Moscow, Russia. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-

0002-2770-8282

*** Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Moscow, Russia. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-

0001-5695-8080

**** State Corporation «Rostec», Moscow, Russia; Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Moscow,

Russia. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7729-7234

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Análisis comparativo de la prevención del

blanqueo de dinero en diferentes países

Resumen

El objetivo de la investigación fue analizar la lucha contra el lavado de

dinero obtenido por medios delictivos como una de las prioridades del

desarrollo socioeconómico de todos los países con economías avanzadas.

Esto es particularmente importante en el período de la lucha contra el

COVID-19, cuando los países enfrentaron un declive económico global,

décits presupuestarios crecientes y la necesidad de encontrar mecanismos

para estimular el crecimiento económico en condiciones de un gran

número de restricciones impuestas por la infección por coronavirus. Los

autores utilizaron los métodos de análisis de documentos cientícos, leyes

y normas jurídicas. Como resultados, se efectuó un análisis comparativo

de los principales elementos de los sistemas contra el lavado de dinero en

diferentes países y, ademas, se indican las características de la construcción

de sistemas ALD/CFT a nivel internacional. Se concluye que, por regla

general, las autoridades gubernamentales parten del entendimiento de

que los bancos conocen a sus clientes y entienden sus operaciones mejor

que la agencia de inteligencia nanciera y la autoridad supervisora. Por lo

tanto, también creen que es necesario enviar a la agencia de inteligencia

nanciera información ya «ltrada» sobre transacciones sospechosas, que

probablemente sera utilizada por las autoridades policiales.

Palabra clave: lucha contra el blanqueo de capitales; umbral de

control; producto delictivo; inteligencia nanciera;

sector nanciero global.

Introduction

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, under the inuence of the

rapid development of information, nancial and transport technologies, the

world became global. The global economy is dominated by multinational

corporations, which equaled the economic power and political inuence of

nation-states. Rapidly developing technological advances have oered new

forms of communication that have opened up additional opportunities for

organized crime. As a result, conditions have developed that are extremely

favorable for the growth of the criminal economy, which has also become

global in scale, structure of relations and spheres of activity.

The analysis of the structure of the modern economic system allows

us to clearly reveal the economic content of the concept of” money

laundering”. The essence of money laundering is that the money acquired

718

Nadezda Vasilievna Sedova, Darya Mikhailovna Melnikova, Ludmila Sergeevna Marien y

Darina Alexandrovna Sizova

Comparative analysis of the prevention of the laundering of the proceeds of crime in dierent countries

illegally is appeared as receives in the eyes of the state and society a form

that completely or largely hides their origin. In practice, after laundering

“dirty” money becomes indistinguishable from legally obtained money.

The legalization of criminal proceeds is a complex process involving many

dierent operations performed by a variety of methods that are constantly

being improved. Despite the huge variety of mechanisms and schemes of

legalization, they are based on almost one technology.

1. Research and methodology

In the Russian Federation, the subject of legalization (laundering) of

proceeds from crime is money or other property, the illegal acquisition of

which is a sign of a specic crime (for example, theft, taking a bribe), as well

as money or other property received as a material reward for a crime (for

example, for murder for hire) or as payment for the sale of items restricted

in civil circulation.

There are dierences in national AML/CFT systems and methods due

to dierent initial states of economies and the role of shadow components

in them. Given these dierences, the approaches to the ght against ML/

FT various foreign countries can be classied into the following groups

(Alifanova, Evlakhova, 2015; Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist

nancing measures, 2019; Voznyakovskaya, 2012):

1) The Countries to which legal norms in the ght against ML/TF was

formed largely under the inuence of international law (member

countries of the European Union and the member States of the

Council of Europe).

2) Countries whose legal norms in the eld of combating ML/FT were

formed for the most part within the national legal framework without

signicant inuence of international law (the United States, Canada

and other countries of the American continent). Such a feature of the

US legislation is due to the fact that in this country the legislation

on combating organized crime and, accordingly, on laundering the

proceeds from criminal activities was created in the early 70s of the

last century, when the international legal framework in the eld of

countering these types of criminal activities was not yet at the level of

the United Nations, or at the regional, in particular European, level

(Money Laundering and Tax Evasion, 2017; National assessment

of the risks of legalization (laundering) of criminal proceeds, 2018;

Money laundering, 2018).

3) Asian countries have strong and competent law enforcement agencies,

but the transparency of their nancial systems is insucient to judge

the extent of money laundering.

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4) Countries whose legal norms in the eld of combating ML/FT have

not yet been formed, but are only in their infancy (these are a number

of States in Africa and Latin America). In most countries in these

regions, no measures have been taken against ML/FT. For example,

in Africa, there are relatively few countries that have ratied the

Vienna Convention and adopted special measures against money

laundering, which may simply mean that there is no money laundering

problem on the same scale as in other regions (Solongo, 2001; Anti-

money laundering and counter-terrorist nancing measures, 2019;

Schneider, 2010).

It should be noted that the legal norms of control in the banking and

nancial sphere are of particular importance at the present time, since it is

a platform where the most of this type of crime occurs. Increased attention

in the legislation of various countries is aimed to the control of ML/FT at

the stage of their placement in nancial institutions. Research shows that

this phase of the legalization of criminal proceeds is the most vulnerable to

state control. The eectiveness of any ML/FT control model depends on the

extent to which it ensures nancial transparency of the activities of nancial

and non-nancial sector institutions for authorized government bodies.

2. Results and Discussion

Table 1 provides a detailed analysis of the main elements of the national

AML/CFT systems of the countries that received a high FAFT rating as

part of the preparation of the mutual assessment report. Here are some

distinctive features of the organization of foreign AML/CFT systems.

720

Nadezda Vasilievna Sedova, Darya Mikhailovna Melnikova, Ludmila Sergeevna Marien y

Darina Alexandrovna Sizova

Comparative analysis of the prevention of the laundering of the proceeds of crime in dierent countries

Table 1. Analysis of the main elements of national

AML/CFT systems*

Country Year

adop-

tion

of the

law

Special legislation Finan-

cial

Intelli-

gence

Unit

(FIU)

Control

thresh-

olds

Re-

sponsi-

ble for

inform-

ing the

FIU

Special

software

systems

for an-

alytical

work

Criminal

liability

for mon-

ey laun-

dering

Russia 2001 Federal Law of

07.08.2001 No.

115-FZ; Art. 174 and

174.1 of the Criminal

Code of the Russian

Federation;

-special regulatory

legal acts of the Bank

of Russia

Federal

Service

for Fi-

nancial

Moni-

toring

(Rosn-

moni-

toring)

600,000

rubles,

about

8,000

USD

Respon-

sible

employ-

ees of

nancial

interme-

diaries

Infor-

mation

Resources

of Rosn-

monitor-

ing and

the Bank

of Russia

Low

enough

(from a

monetary

ne to

impris-

onment

up to 7

years)

The USA 1970 - Bank Secrecy Act

(BSA), 1970;

- Money Laundering

Control Act, 1986;

- Comprehensive

Money Laundering

Act, 1986;

- Anti-Drug Abuse

Act,1988;

- Crime Central Act.

Par. 2532, 1990;

- Housing and Com-

munity Development

Act, 1992

- Presidential Deci-

sion Directive (PDD)

№ 42, 1995;

- Foreign Account

Tax Compliance Act

(FATCA), 2013

FinCEN 10 000

USD

Respon-

sible

employ-

ees of

nancial

interme-

diaries

CBQS

Curren-

cy and

Banking

Inquiry

System

Very high

(impris-

onment

up to life

imprison-

ment)

Great

Britain

1986 - Money Laundering

Control Law , 1896;

Terrorism Act

2000;

Anti-terrorism,

Crime and Security

Act, 2001;

Proceeds of Crime

Act, 2002;

Serious Organised

Crime and Police

Act, 2005;

- Money Laundering

Regulations, 2007

- Criminal Finances

Act 2017

National

Crim-

inal

Intelli-

gence

Service

(NCIS)

10 000

EUR

Money

laun-

dering

reporting

ocer,

MLRO

Informa-

tion and

analytical

center

NCIS

High

(impris-

onment

for up to

14 years,

including

inspectors

(MLRO),

not

who

reported

a dubious

operation)

Italy 1991

Law No. 646 “On

the ght against the

maa”, 1982;

Law No. 55 “

On the activity of

nancial and credit

institutions of the

country”, 1990;

UIC 10 000

EUR

Respon-

sible

employ-

ees of

nancial

interme-

diaries

GIANOS

system

High

(impris-

onment

for up to

12 years

or more,

as well

as large

monetary

ne)

* compiled by the authors

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USA. FinCEN currently has the world’s largest data bank by volume

of information and the most advanced data management system, which

includes software based on articial intelligence methodology. AI/MPP

(MPP - Massive Parallel Processing) technology allows monitoring of the

entire American electronic banking process in real time. The AI/MRP

articial intelligence system automatically scans more than 70 major

American databases, combining fragmentary information about the object

under study. It is able to detect illogical / atypical nancial transactions

for further study by specialists (Alstadster et al., 2017; Leandro, Schneider,

2018). FinCEN works with the U.S. Treasury Department to develop AML/

CFT programs, and specic verication programs for individual foreign

accounts.

According to foreign experts, FinCEN is the largest of all existing

databases, capable of processing and analyzing huge amounts of

information in the short term. It should be noted that since January 1,

2013, the US law “On Taxation of Foreign Accounts” (Foreign Account

Tax Compliance Act, FATCA) has entered into force, according to which

nancial organizations of all countries must conclude a special agreement

with the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on monitoring the availability

of accounts of American taxpayers and from January 1, 2014, transmit

information about them to the IRS. At the same time, if the nancial

institution does not have such an agreement, 30% will be forcibly withheld

from the amounts of money transfers originating in the United States; from

the proceeds received from the sale of American assets (for example, shares

or bonds), regardless of whether a prot or loss was obtained as a result of

the transaction; from all transfers to organizations that have not entered

into this agreement. Moreover, the IRS also undertakes to provide relevant

information to the tax authorities of these countries.

The compliance of nancial institutions with the requirements of US

AML/CFT legislation is regulated by Regulation 31 CFR 103.1215 and

section 326 of the US PATRIOT6 Act, according to which each nancial

institution is required to perform a customer identication program

(hereinafter referred to as PIK) in accordance with the size and nature of its

activities, including certain minimum requirements. It should also provide

for reasonable and practical risk-based procedures to verify the identity

5 The Client Identication Programs Statement was developed jointly by the US Treasury Department,

FinCEN, the Oce of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Savings Oversight Oce and the National

Credit Union Administration, and has been applied in practice since 10/01/2003.

6 USA PATRIOT Act, a law passed by the US Congress and signed by President George W. Bush on

10/26/2001 (after the 9/11/2001 terrorist attack). Thanks to this law, the powers of the special

services in the eld of anti-terrorist activities were signicantly expanded. The law also extends to the

nancial sector, expanding the powers of the competent authorities to carry out regulatory activities

and supervise nancial transactions, especially those that are carried out by foreign private and legal

entities.

722

Nadezda Vasilievna Sedova, Darya Mikhailovna Melnikova, Ludmila Sergeevna Marien y

Darina Alexandrovna Sizova

Comparative analysis of the prevention of the laundering of the proceeds of crime in dierent countries

of each client. These procedures should enable the nancial institution to

reasonably believe that it knows the true identity of each client.

Based on the analysis of documents and established banking practices

of AML/CFT adopted in the United States, we conclude that the success

of any nancial investigation requires the principle of “follow money”

(“follow money”), together with a thorough review of many documents on

transactions, including using information from a bank account, research

via the Internet, reports on credit transactions, taxpayer taxes, nancial

reports (balance sheet, income statement, etc.), suspicious transactions or

activities (SAR), as well as analytical reports FBAR, CTR. We believe that in

order to develop AML/CFT mechanisms in Russia, attention should be paid

to these facts (Haruk, 2010; National assessment of the risks of legalization

(laundering) of criminal proceeds, 2018).

The experience of European countries is also interesting for Russian

practice. In European countries, the system of monitoring and informing

about banking operations and transactions is built dierently, depending

on the specics of a particular country.

The United Kingdom became the rst European country to ratify

the Council of Europe Convention on laundering, search, seizure and

conscation of the proceeds of crime in 1990.

In 1992, the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) is established

in the UK, which is responsible for collecting, storing, estimating and

analyzing information about serious crimes, including those related to

ML/FT. This activity allows to create data banks on almost all aspects of

crime. The Service receives information about suspicious transactions

from authorized state bodies (this duty is assigned to AML/CFT inspectors

(money laundering reporting ocer)). An employee of a nancial

institution is obliged to inform the competent authorities about the

transaction performed by the client, if this employee suspects that the

client’s transaction is aimed at ML/FT, or the amount for it exceeds the

established threshold value.

The Oce of Strategic and Special Intelligence NCIS is located in

London and is a think tank that studies various aspects of high-risk

crimes. The Department collects, researches and analyzes information on

economic crimes. Reports on the work in the form of dossiers, memoranda

and qualied opinions are submitted by this oce to the British law

enforcement and other authorities. The reports contain information on

trends and trends in the development of crime. This NCIS unit is also

engaged in tactical intelligence against criminals and criminal groups.

The nancial Investigation Departments of the police forces of the UK

counties, based on the materials of the NCIS, carry out operational checks

of persons suspected of possessing or disposing of criminal proceeds. If

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it is necessary to obtain information about the accounts of the client of

a nancial and credit institution, the local police ocers are required to

apply to the court for a production order, on the basis of which the nancial

and credit institution has the right to provide the police with information

about the movement of the client’s funds. For example, if individuals have

information or assumptions that the money is illegal income from the

commission of a crime, and they do not report this to the relevant competent

authorities, they can be prosecuted with imprisonment for up to ve years.

Thus, we can conclude that the system is under/The UK CFT has a three-

level structure, where the central place is occupied by the state body, which

is responsible for nancial monitoring of data received from the primary

AML/CFT subsystem (inspectors of nancial institutions on allegations of

money laundering), as well as conducting their preliminary analysis with

further transmission of information to law enforcement agencies and courts

in the UK. At the same time, the main feature of such an AML/CFT system

is the presence in the FIU body of a database of suspicious transactions

with the possibility of access to it by police agencies, which undoubtedly

increases the eectiveness of interaction between supervisory and law

enforcement agencies.

In order to improve the eectiveness of the interaction of Russian state

bodies in the eld of AML/CFT, attention should be paid to these facts.

In Italy, the ght against nancial crimes was launched earlier than in

many other European countries.

In 1982, the Law No. 646 “On combating the Maa” was adopted, which

allowed the verication of bank accounts of persons suspected of involvement

in criminal groups, and the investigation of real estate transactions made

by them. The Italian law enforcement authorities have the right to study

the lifestyle, nancial situation, sources of income of citizens suspected of

belonging to criminal syndicates, and members of their families (wives,

children), as well as individuals and legal entities whose property and funds

the suspects may directly or indirectly dispose of.

In addition, in Italy, persons involved in the legalization (laundering) of

income and property obtained by criminal means can be imprisoned for a

period of 7 to 12 years and subject to a large monetary ne. For ocials who

use their ocial position, the period of punishment for the same criminal

acts may be extended. Law No. 197, adopted in 1991, introduced a control

system that includes:

• Prohibition of circulation of bearer securities.

• Mandatory indication of the beneciary when performing a large-

amount transaction;

• Limit the maximum amount of funds in bearer accounts to 20

million liras (from 01.03.2003-10 000 EUR).

724

Nadezda Vasilievna Sedova, Darya Mikhailovna Melnikova, Ludmila Sergeevna Marien y

Darina Alexandrovna Sizova

Comparative analysis of the prevention of the laundering of the proceeds of crime in dierent countries

• The role of the nancial intelligence agency, which receives

information about suspicious transactions, is performed by a special

body of the Bank of Italy-UIC (Ucio Italiano dei Cambi), which

has the following functions::

• Statistical accounting and operational analysis of the Italian balance

of payments.

• Management of foreign exchange reserves.

• Preventing and combating the legalization (laundering) of criminal

proceeds, through nancial analysis and intelligence.

The UIC operates in close cooperation with the Financial Guard units. The

Financial Guard is a security agency that carries out special investigations

of suspicious nancial transactions detected by the UIC. The main purpose

of the guard units is to identify the sources of income and determine the

composition of the property of the accused and suspects. When the facts of

violation of the law are established in the course of a special investigation,

the information is brought to the Chief Prosecutor, who decides to initiate

a criminal investigation.

Thus, it should be noted that within the framework of the Italian AML/

CFT system, the Financial Guard carries out operational and investigative

activities, while the functions of the Italian FIU-UIC consist exclusively

in information and analytical support. In addition, the competence of the

Financial Guard includes smuggling and organized crime in the nancial

sphere.

Summarizing the above, it is necessary to note that, despite many

international recommendations, there are no common approaches to

the organization of work in the eld of AML/CFT in banking institutions

in dierent countries. Each country has its own characteristics of the

organization of this work. However, there are also general principles of this

work. Almost all developed foreign countries have adopted AML/CFT laws,

established nancial intelligence units, developed special programs, and set

thresholds for monitoring. Special tools have been developed that banks use

to manage ML/FT risks: indicators for identifying suspicious transactions,

setting transaction thresholds, having special reports and databases,

developing special programs and software, as well as a corporate strategy

for AML/CFT purposes (Johnson, 2019; Summary rating for assessing the

eectiveness…, 2020; Voznyakovskaya, 2012).

The Russian AML/CFT system diers from most foreign AML/CFT

systems, primarily by the increased level of detail of the rules and procedures

described in laws and regulations, and the relatively strict regulation of the

activities of credit institutions under AML/FT.

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In addition, Russian credit institutions have a fairly passive role in the

AML/CFT system. In essence, this role is limited to the registration, storage

and transmission of information about transactions subject to mandatory

control. In turn, the burden of conducting nancial investigations in Russia

largely lies not on the banks themselves, but on the Bank of Russia and

Rosnmonitoring, which acts as a “lter” for processing and analyzing

information, standing between the banking system and law enforcement

agencies.

At the same time, in most foreign AML/CFT systems, the nancial

intelligence unit receives information that has already been substantially

processed (“ltered”) in the banks themselves, which are engaged in

nancial investigations. The information presented below allows us to

assess how carefully foreign banks “dose” information sent to nancial

intelligence units in comparison with Russian banks (Table 2). The data

in table 2 should be understood taking into account the scale of banking

systems.

Table 2. Number of reports submitted by banks from dierent

countries to nancial intelligence agencies*

Country Number of messages per year, million

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Russia 6 7,5 8,9 9,5 10,2 12,7 22,2 30 33,8 29,3

The USA 2,1 1,7 1,9 2,7 1,6 1,97 1,8 1,9 2 2,2

Great

Britain

0,24 0,32 0,41 0,279 0,316 0,354 0,381 0,418 0,441 0,478

Italy 0,021 0,0373 0,049 0,067 0,064 0,072 0,082 0,101 0,094 0,098

* compiled by the authors

Conclusion

In the foreign countries the government authorities proceed from the

understanding that banks know their customers and understand their

operations better than the nancial intelligence agency and the supervisory

authority. Therefore, they believe that it is necessary to send to the nancial

intelligence agency already “ltered” information about suspicious

transactions, which is highly likely to be used by law enforcement and

supervisory authorities.

726

Nadezda Vasilievna Sedova, Darya Mikhailovna Melnikova, Ludmila Sergeevna Marien y

Darina Alexandrovna Sizova

Comparative analysis of the prevention of the laundering of the proceeds of crime in dierent countries

There are strong arguments that national AML/CFT systems based

on the principle of granting banks broad rights and powers in the eld of

AML/CFT, based on the priority of the substantive side of work over the

formal side, are the most advanced and eective (if we use the traditional

understanding of eciency as the ratio of results and the cost of resources

to achieve them).

The conducted research and comparison of national AML/CFT systems

makes it clear that the focus should be shifted to the internal control of

banks.

First, such AML/CFT systems increase the eectiveness of the work of

state bodies in identifying illegal, socially dangerous activities as a result

of monitoring banking operations and, accordingly, suppressing these

activities.

Secondly, advanced AML/CFT systems help to reduce the costs and

expenses across the economy for carrying out work in the eld of AML

/ CFT by achieving the fullest possible alignment and harmony of the

interests of the banking sector with the interests of the state. The emphasis

is placed on the fact that banks independently and in their own interests

build an internal control system aimed at managing the risks associated

with customer service.

Thus, the experience of the United States and European countries can

be used in solving the issue of developing mechanisms to counteract the

legalization of illegal income in the banking system in Russia. At the same

time, it should be understood that an insuciently thought-out and hasty

copying of even the most advanced foreign experience, without a preliminary

assessment of the readiness of national authorities and business circles to

accept these changes, can lead not to an increase in the eectiveness of the

AML/CFT system, but, on the contrary, to negative results. In addition, it

should be noted that an important step towards the eective functioning

of any AML/CFT system is to understand the economic content of the

process of legalization (laundering) of illegal income, its manifestations

and consequences.

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Esta revista fue editada en formato digital y publicada

en enero de 2022, por el Fondo Editorial Serbiluz,

Universidad del Zulia. Maracaibo-Venezuela

Vol.40 Nº 72